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  OPINION 
_____________________ 
  
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Akeem Caldwell brings this appeal following his 
conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Caldwell contends that he is 
entitled to a new trial because the District Court (1) 
erroneously admitted evidence that he had two prior 
convictions for unlawful firearm possession and (2) 
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improperly excluded a third-party’s out-of-court 
statement admitting responsibility for the offense. 
Because we conclude that admission of Caldwell’s prior 
convictions was improper, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
On January 24, 2012, at approximately 11:45 p.m., 
three detectives with the Pittsburgh Police Department—
Judd Emery, Robert Smith, and Mark Adametz—were on 
patrol in an unmarked police cruiser near the Northview 
Heights housing projects. As they approached the 
intersection of Penfort Street and Mount Pleasant Road, 
they spotted Akeem Caldwell and Darby Tigney walking 
side-by-side in the direction of the police car. When the 
detectives’ car turned left onto Mount Pleasant Road, 
Detective Emery observed Caldwell remove a black 
firearm from his waistband and hold it behind Tigney’s 
back. Emery immediately alerted the other detectives to 
the presence of the weapon and brought the cruiser to a 
stop. He then jumped out and ran to the rear of the car, 
drew his weapon, and yelled: “Pittsburgh Police. Drop 
the gun.”  
Emery later testified that, upon his command, 
Caldwell released the firearm, letting it fall to the ground 
directly between Tigney’s legs. Emery then directed 
Caldwell and Tigney to get on the ground, and the other 
detectives placed them in handcuffs. As he was being 
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placed in custody, Caldwell emphatically insisted that he 
was not the one who had been holding the gun, 
exclaiming: “That’s not my gun. You didn’t see me with 
a gun.” App. 402. 
Detective Smith, who was sitting in the front 
passenger seat at the time of the encounter, testified that 
he saw Caldwell “brandish” the weapon and later release 
the gun behind Tigney’s back. Detective Adametz, who 
was seated in the rear passenger seat, testified that he 
could not see the gun in Caldwell’s hands because 
Caldwell’s arm was obstructed by Tigney’s body. 
However, he stated that both of Tigney’s hands were 
visible and empty when the gun fell to the ground. 
Caldwell provided his identity to the detectives, 
and a records search revealed that he had a prior criminal 
record. After discovering that Caldwell was a convicted 
felon who was not permitted to possess a firearm, the 
detectives transported him to the Allegheny County Jail 
for processing. Tigney, on the other hand, identified 
himself as “Shakur Jackson.” The detectives, unaware 
that Tigney had falsely identified himself, released him 
into the custody of a woman who claimed to be his aunt 
after they determined that “Shakur Jackson” did not have 
a criminal record.  
 Caldwell was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On 
April 16, 2012, shortly after that charge was filed, Tigney 
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contacted Caldwell’s defense counsel and claimed that he 
(Tigney) was the one who had possessed the firearm the 
evening of Caldwell’s arrest and that he intended to turn 
himself in to prosecutors. During a follow-up interview 
with a defense investigator, Tigney asserted that the gun 
had fallen from his pants and that Caldwell did not know 
about the gun. Tigney also admitted that he lied to the 
officers about his identity. After providing this statement 
to Caldwell’s defense team, Tigney retained independent 
counsel and asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege not 
to testify. 
The case against Caldwell proceeded to trial on 
November 14, 2012. The result was a mistrial after a jury 
was unable to reach a verdict. United States v. Caldwell, 
No 2:12-cr-0111 (W.D. Pa.), Docket Nos. 72, 112. A 
second trial commenced on December 4, 2012. This time, 
the jury returned a verdict finding Caldwell guilty of the 
§ 922(g)(1) offense.
1
  
Caldwell’s theory at trial was that Tigney—and 
                                                 
1
  Although the second trial is the operative proceeding 
for purposes of this appeal, the parties and the District Court 
repeatedly referenced and incorporated remarks from the 
earlier proceeding when arguing the evidentiary questions at 
the second trial. Accordingly, we consider the jointly 
submitted portions of the record from both the first 
proceeding as well as the second trial. 
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only Tigney—possessed the gun on the evening of his 
arrest. In support of this claim, Caldwell repeatedly 
emphasized that Tigney provided a false name to the 
detectives at the scene, and that this indicated a 
consciousness of guilt. Caldwell also sought to admit, as 
a statement against interest, Tigney’s out-of-court 
admission to defense investigators that he had possessed 
the gun. The District Court initially granted Caldwell’s 
motion in limine requesting that he be allowed to 
introduce Tigney’s statement. On the Government’s 
motion for reconsideration, however, the Court changed 
its decision on the morning of the first trial, holding that 
the statement lacked the corroborating circumstances 
necessary to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 
On the morning of the second trial, prosecutors informed 
the Court and defense counsel that Tigney had recanted 
his earlier admission. Noting that Tigney’s decision to 
disavow his prior statement bolstered its ruling from the 
first proceeding, the Court again held the statement to be 
inadmissible.  
In addition to arguing that Tigney possessed the 
firearm, Caldwell sought to impeach the credibility of the 
testifying detectives. Caldwell theorized that the 
detectives targeted him rather than Tigney as the 
possessor of the gun because he had a prior felony 
conviction, thus subjecting him to federal charges, 
whereas Tigney, a juvenile, was subject to only an 
adjudication of delinquency. Caldwell also pointed out 
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that, despite having done so in other cases, investigators 
never sought to obtain surveillance footage of the 
Northview Heights scene of his encounter with police 
from the Housing Authority. Such evidence, he 
maintained, would have shown that Tigney possessed the 
gun. 
Caldwell testified in his defense at both trials. He 
claimed that, at the time he was stopped by the 
detectives, he was holding a cell phone in his hand—not 
a gun—and was talking to his girlfriend, Tiffany Dungan. 
Dungan corroborated this claim by testifying that she was 
on the phone with Caldwell when the police stopped him. 
She also presented phone records showing that, around 
the time of the arrest, she participated in a seventeen 
minute phone call with a number that she claimed 
belonged to Caldwell. Caldwell also offered the 
testimony of a bystander, Manly Banks, who stated that 
he witnessed an officer take a cell phone out of 
Caldwell’s hand and hang up the phone. 
In the course of cross-examining Caldwell during 
the first trial, the Government sought to introduce, under 
both Rule 404(b) and Rule 609(a)(1)(B) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, two prior convictions for unlawful 
firearm possession. One of Caldwell’s “priors” was a 
federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon—the very offense for which he was 
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being tried.
2
 With respect to Rule 404(b), the 
Government argued the evidence was admissible to show 
“knowledge and absence of mistake or accident.” App. 
313. Caldwell’s counsel countered that absence of 
mistake and knowledge were irrelevant because the only 
issue in the case was whether Caldwell actually 
possessed the gun. Indeed, he conceded that “[w]hoever 
possessed [the gun] knew it.”3 App. 317.  
The District Court was initially skeptical of the 
Government’s claim that the evidence was admissible 
under Rule 404(b). See App. 313 (“What do you think he 
said that would make it more than propensity evidence? 
What do you think he says that goes to knowledge and 
                                                 
2
   Caldwell filed pretrial motions in limine in advance of 
both trials seeking to exclude evidence of his prior 
convictions. In both instances, the District Court denied the 
motions as premature, noting its intention to “rule on the 
admissibility of [the] evidence at trial after considering its 
factual context.” App. 72; see also App. 351–52.  
 
3
  This statement was consistent with Caldwell’s position 
throughout both trials. See App. 119 (offering to “stipulate 
that whoever possessed the firearm on January 24, 2012 also 
had the requisite knowledge and intent to possess that 
firearm”); App. 600–01 (arguing to the jury at closing that 
“whoever possessed that gun had the knowledge that it was a 
gun and intended to possess it. It’s who possessed it [that] is 
the question. Not knowledge and intent”).  
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intent? He’s saying he never had a gun. . . . He’s not 
saying I had it and it was somebody else’s.”). After a 
short recess, however, the Court ruled in favor of the 
Government: “[I]n terms of 404(b) evidence, I agree with 
the government that knowledge and intent is an issue 
here and I am going to allow [the prosecutor] to question 
Mr. Caldwell about his prior convictions for firearm 
violations.” App. 318–19. The Court continued: 
I understand it’s prejudicial, but when you 
have a situation where this is a complete 
credibility determination, Mr. Caldwell has 
testified in a manner diametrically opposed 
to those of the police officers and I do 
believe it is probative for knowledge and 
intent and that that probative value 
outweighs the prejudicial effect, which I 
acknowledge is prejudicial. 
App. 319. Defense counsel immediately objected to the 
Court’s reference to Caldwell’s “credibility,” which is 
generally not a concern in the 404(b) inquiry. This, in 
turn, prompted the Court to clarify its position: “So the 
record is clear, I’m not saying . . . it is admissible for 
credibility. I’m saying it’s admissible for knowledge and 
intent . . . .” App. 319–20. 
This review process was more streamlined when 
the second trial took place. The Government again sought 
to introduce Caldwell’s prior convictions during cross-
10 
 
examination. But instead of explaining the basis for 
admissibility, the prosecutor simply asked for “a ruling 
on which convictions . . . would be permissible for the 
Government to inquire as to the Defendant about.” App. 
525. Recalling the Government’s proffer and arguments 
from the previous trial, the Court again ruled the 
evidence was admissible: 
I know what your arguments are, not only 
because I’ve heard them before, but because 
they’ve been incorporated into your written 
submissions. . . . [O]n the prior convictions 
for illegal possession of firearms, when the 
Defendant, as here, is charged with a 
specific intent crime, the knowing 
possession of a firearm unlawfully, the 
Government may present other acts or 
evidence to prove intent and knowledge, and 
I find that Mr. Caldwell has put his 
knowledge and intent to possess a firearm at 
issue by claiming innocence.  
App. 525–26. The Court then discussed Rule 403 
balancing, stating “not only are [Caldwell’s prior 
convictions] admissible under 404(b), but because 
knowledge and intent are at issue here, they are more 
probative than prejudicial. I find that the probative value 
outweighs any prejudicial effect as well as to their 
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admissibility.”4 App. 527. 
At the close of the second trial, the jury returned a 
verdict convicting Caldwell of the charged offense. The 
District Court sentenced Caldwell to 77 months in prison 
and three years of supervised release. Caldwell timely 
filed this appeal.
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II. 
 Caldwell’s primary argument is that the District 
Court erred in admitting his two prior convictions for 
unlawful weapons possession. We review a district 
court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010). 
“We exercise plenary review, however, of [the district 
court’s] rulings to the extent they are based on a legal 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Id. 
(quoting Complaint of Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 
126, 131 (3d Cir. 1997)). This includes plenary review 
over “whether evidence falls within the scope of Rule 
404(b).” United States v. Smith, 725 F.3d 340, 344–45 
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Green, 617 F.3d at 239). 
                                                 
4
  The Court initially neglected to balance the probative 
value against the prejudicial effect, but later conducted the 
Rule 403 balancing after the Government requested that the 
test be made explicit “[f]or the record.” App. 526. 
5
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291.  
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 We have repeatedly emphasized that Rule 404(b) 
must be applied with careful precision, and that evidence 
of a defendant’s prior bad acts is not to be admitted 
unless both the proponent and the District Court plainly 
identify a proper, non-propensity purpose for its 
admission. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 
(3d Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 
883, 887 (3d Cir. 1992)). For the reasons discussed 
below, we conclude the evidence of Caldwell’s prior 
convictions was not admitted for a proper purpose. 
A. 
 It is indisputable that evidence of Caldwell’s prior 
convictions satisfies Rule 401’s definition of relevant 
evidence, at least to the extent a criminal defendant’s 
prior offenses make it more likely he would commit the 
same crime again. As our Supreme Court long ago 
explained, “logically speaking, it is quite clear that an 
antecedent bad character would form quite as reasonable 
a ground for the presumption and probability of guilt as a 
previous good character lays the foundation of 
innocence.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 
476 n.9 (1948) (citation omitted); see also 1 Wigmore on 
Evidence § 55 (3d ed. 1940) (“A defendant’s character, 
then, as indicating the probability of his doing or not 
doing the act charged, is essentially relevant.”). 
Yet notwithstanding the logical relevance of this 
evidence, Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a 
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crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). This rule reflects the 
longstanding concern that evidence of prior bad acts, 
when offered only to show the defendant’s propensity to 
commit the charged crime, “is said to weigh too much 
with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice 
one with a bad general record and deny him a fair 
opportunity to defend against a particular charge.” 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886 (quoting Michelson, 335 U.S. 
at 475). 
Derived from English common law, Rule 404(b)’s 
instruction that prior criminal acts are not admissible to 
show a defendant’s propensity to commit the charged 
offense is now well-entrenched in our American 
jurisprudence. But such prior act evidence was not 
always prohibited. Indeed, early English courts did not 
recognize a rule excluding evidence of prior bad acts, and 
instead evaluated the admissibility of such acts according 
to the ordinary test of relevance. See Julius Stone, The 
Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 
Harv. L. Rev. 954, 958–59 (1933). Prior act evidence 
was easily admissible under this approach, “even if the 
only theory of relevance was to establish the defendant’s 
character and, in turn, use character as circumstantial 
proof of conduct.” 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence § 2:25 (2009).  
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Over time, however, courts and commentators 
came to appreciate the uniquely prejudicial impact that 
prior bad act evidence has on a jury. By the turn of the 
nineteenth century, British and American courts were in 
agreement that prior act evidence introduced for the 
limited purpose of showing a defendant’s propensity to 
commit the charged offense should be excluded. Stone, 
supra, at 958. The evidence in question, however, could 
still be introduced “if [it] was relevant for any purpose 
other than, or in addition to, a suggestion of a general 
propensity to commit the [charged] crimes.” Kenneth J. 
Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1558 (1998). Non-propensity 
purposes for which evidence was admitted included, inter 
alia, proof of knowledge, intent, motive, and identity. 
Stone, supra, at 966. 
 Throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth, American courts differed as to whether the 
common law rule was “exclusionary” or “inclusionary.” 
Davis, 726 F.3d at 441 (citing United States v. Long, 574 
F.2d 761, 765–66 (3d Cir. 1978)). Both of these 
descriptors can be misleading. To be sure, no one 
doubted that evidence relevant only for the limited 
purpose of showing a defendant’s general propensity to 
commit the charged offense was inadmissible. Instead, 
the debate concerned whether the list of previously 
recognized non-propensity purposes was exhaustive (or 
“exclusive”), or whether any non-propensity purpose, 
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even if not previously recognized, could support 
admission of the prior act evidence (the “inclusive” 
approach). See David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore: 
Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events §4.3.2, 
at 224 (2009) (“[T]he real question . . . is whether the 
courts actually confine admissibility to a set of 
enumerated purposes.”).  
The matter was settled in 1975 with the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. After noting its general 
prohibition on prior act evidence to prove a person’s 
character, the text of new Rule 404(b)(2) provided that 
prior act evidence “may be admissible for another 
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) 
(emphasis added). By introducing the list of permissible 
purposes with the words “such as,” the drafters made 
clear that the list was not exclusive or otherwise limited 
to a strictly defined class.  
 We have on occasion noted that Rule 404(b) 
adopted an inclusionary approach. See, e.g., Davis, 726 
F.3d at 441. Our use of the term “inclusionary” merely 
reiterates the drafters’ decision to not restrict the non-
propensity uses of evidence. It does not suggest that prior 
offense evidence is presumptively admissible. On this 
point, let us be clear: Rule 404(b) is a rule of general 
exclusion, and carries with it “no presumption of 
admissibility.” 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
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Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:28, at 731 (4th ed. 
2013) [hereinafter Mueller, Federal Evidence]. The Rule 
reflects the revered and longstanding policy that, under 
our system of justice, an accused is tried for what he did, 
not who he is. And in recognition that prior offense 
evidence is generally more prejudicial than probative, 
Rule 404(b) directs that evidence of prior bad acts be 
excluded—unless the proponent can demonstrate that the 
evidence is admissible for a non-propensity purpose. 
The “permitted uses” of prior act evidence set forth 
in Rule 404(b)(2) are treated like exceptions to this rule 
of exclusion. As is generally the case with exceptions, the 
party seeking to admit evidence under Rule 404(b)(2) 
bears the burden of demonstrating its applicability. Our 
opinions have repeatedly and consistently emphasized 
that the burden of identifying a proper purpose rests with 
the proponent of the evidence, usually the government. 
See, e.g., Davis, 726 F.3d at 442 (discussing proponent’s 
burden to identify a proper purpose and explain how the 
proffered evidence is relevant to that purpose); Sampson, 
980 F.2d at 887 (same). This hurdle is not 
insurmountable, but it must be satisfied before the 
exception can be invoked.  
There are four distinct steps that must be taken 
before evidence is admissible for a non-propensity 
purpose under Rule 404(b)(2). First, the proponent must 
identify a proper 404(b) purpose for admission (such as 
knowledge or intent) that is “at issue” in, or relevant to, 
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the case. In evaluating whether an identified purpose is 
“at issue,” courts should consider the “material issues and 
facts the government must prove to obtain a conviction.” 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 888. We stress that “a proponent’s 
incantation of the proper uses of [prior act] evidence . . . 
does not magically transform inadmissible evidence into 
admissible evidence.” United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 
129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999). Rather, the proponent must 
identify a specific purpose that “is of consequence in 
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(b).  
Once the proponent identifies a non-propensity 
purpose that is “at issue” in the case, the proponent must 
next explain how the evidence is relevant to that purpose. 
This step is crucial. The task is not merely “to find a 
pigeonhole in which the proof might fit,” but to actually 
demonstrate that the evidence “prove[s] something other 
than propensity.”6 Mueller, Federal Evidence § 4:28, at 
731.  
As we have frequently stated, “[i]n proffering such 
evidence, the government must explain how it fits into a 
                                                 
6
  We emphasize that steps one and two are distinct 
inquiries. The first step requires the proponent to identify a 
proper purpose that is pertinent to the case, whereas the 
second step requires the evidence tend to establish the 
identified purpose. Both must be satisfied before evidence 
may be admitted under Rule 404(b). 
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chain of inferences—a chain that connects the evidence 
to a proper purpose, no link of which is a forbidden 
propensity inference.” Davis, 726 F.3d at 442 (citing 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887). Despite our repeated 
instructions in this area, some proponents of Rule 404(b) 
evidence still fail to follow this course. See United States 
v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 2003) (McKee, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the directive to articulate how 
proffered evidence is relevant for a non-propensity 
purpose is “so often honored in the breach that it 
resonates about as loudly as the proverbial tree that no 
one heard fall in the forest”). To be sure, the proffered 
evidence must be excluded if the proponent neglects or is 
unable to articulate this chain of inferences, and failure to 
exclude such evidence constitutes reversible error. See 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 888.  
To ensure that protections afforded by Rule 404(b) 
are not ignored, we also require care and precision by the 
district court in ruling on the admission of prior act 
evidence for a non-propensity purpose. “The district 
court, if it admits the evidence, must in the first instance, 
rather than the appellate court in retrospect, articulate 
reasons why the evidence also goes to show something 
other than character.” Sampson, 980 F.2d at 888. “The 
reasoning should be detailed and on the record; a mere 
recitation of the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2) is 
insufficient.” Davis, 726 F.3d at 442.  
In reviewing a proffer of relevance, the court 
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should remain mindful that “[r]elevance is not an 
inherent characteristic” of the purposes under Rule 
404(b). Sampson, 980 F.2d at 888 (citation omitted). 
Indeed, “evidence that may be relevant for some 
purposes may be irrelevant for the purpose for which it is 
offered,” or only relevant in some impermissible way. 
Morley, 199 F.3d at 133. “Relevance is a relationship 
between the evidence and a material fact at issue which 
must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make 
a material fact more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.” Sampson, 980 F.2d at 
888.  That is why our decisions are so emphatic in 
requiring the proponent and the trial judge to articulate, 
with precision, a chain of inferences that does not contain 
a propensity link.   
Importantly, the district court’s job is not complete 
once it finds the proponent has shown that the evidence is 
relevant for a proper, non-propensity purpose. Under the 
third step of our analysis, the court must evaluate 
pursuant to Rule 403 whether the evidence is sufficiently 
probative, such that its probative value is not outweighed 
by the inherently prejudicial nature of prior bad act 
evidence. Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889 (reversing because 
Rule 403 balancing not apparent from the record); Smith, 
725 F.3d at 349 (same). This balancing requires great 
care on the part of the district court, “because few 
categories of evidence bring greater risk of prejudice to 
the accused under Rule 403.” Mueller, Federal Evidence 
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§ 4:28, at 731.  
Finally, and if the defendant requests it, the court 
must provide a limiting instruction, which advises the 
jury that the evidence is admissible for a limited purpose 
and may not be considered in another manner. Davis, 726 
F.3d at 445. If such a request is made, the court should 
provide the instruction at the time the evidence is 
admitted. Id.  
To summarize, Rule 404(b) provides that prior act 
evidence is inadmissible unless the evidence is (1) 
offered for a proper non-propensity purpose that is at 
issue in the case; (2) relevant to that identified purpose; 
(3) sufficiently probative under Rule 403 such that its 
probative value is not outweighed by any inherent danger 
of unfair prejudice; and (4) accompanied by a limiting 
instruction, if requested. Davis, 726 F.3d at 441 (citing 
United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 
(1988). With these principles in mind, we turn to whether 
the evidence of Caldwell’s prior convictions was 
properly admitted. We address the four factors seriatim.  
B. 
(1) 
We first consider whether the government offered 
Caldwell’s prior convictions for an acceptable, non-
propensity purpose—i.e., one that is “at issue” in, or 
21 
 
relevant to, the prosecution. At trial, the government 
argued that the evidence was “admissible to show 
knowledge and absence of mistake or accident.” App. 
313. The District Court ultimately concluded the 
evidence was admissible “to prove intent and 
knowledge,” because Caldwell “put his knowledge and 
intent to possess a firearm at issue by claiming 
innocence.” App. 525–26. Because “knowledge” was the 
only purpose mentioned by both the Government and the 
Court, we focus on whether that was a permissible 
purpose under Rule 404(b).
7
 
                                                 
7
  The District Court correctly refused to admit the prior 
act evidence to show “absence of mistake or accident” 
because this Rule 404(b) purpose was not at issue in the case. 
The Government did not present any reason why it would 
have been necessary to prove that Caldwell’s possession was 
not accidental, nor did Caldwell contend that he mistakenly 
possessed the gun. The other purpose mentioned by the 
Court—“intent”—is likewise a non-issue. Caldwell was 
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it 
unlawful for a convicted felon to knowingly possess a 
firearm. United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 422 (2012). The Government 
was not required to prove that Caldwell intentionally 
possessed the gun. Nor did Caldwell contend that he lacked 
such intent. See United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 948 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding prior act evidence not admissible to 
show intent in a trial for unlawful firearm possession by 
convicted felon because § 922(g)(1) does not require 
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In determining whether an identified purpose is at 
issue in a case, we begin by considering the “material 
issues and facts the government must prove to obtain a 
conviction.” Sampson, 980 F.2d at 888. We have 
explained that “the government must . . . proffer a logical 
chain of inference[s] consistent with its theory of the 
case.” Id. (emphasis added). This makes sense in light of 
the definition of relevant evidence. Evidence is relevant 
if it has a tendency to make more or less probable a fact 
that “is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. 
R. Evid. 401(b) (emphasis added).  
The Government charged Caldwell with violating 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for a 
convicted felon to “knowingly possess[] [a] firearm.” 
United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 422 (2012). The government can 
prove possession of a firearm for purposes of §922(g)(1) 
in two ways: (1) by showing that the defendant exercised 
direct physical control over the weapon (actual 
possession), or (2) by showing that he exercised 
dominion or control over the area in which the weapon 
was found (constructive possession). See United States v. 
Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007). At trial, the 
prosecution offered evidence that two detectives directly 
observed Caldwell physically remove the gun from his 
                                                                                                             
government to prove intentional possession). Accordingly, we 
reject both of these purposes as grounds for admitting the 
evidence under Rule 404(b). 
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waistband and hold it behind Tigney’s back. A third 
detective testified that he observed conduct consistent 
with this version of events. There was no contention that 
Caldwell exercised dominion over an area where the gun 
was later found. Rather, the Government’s theory was 
purely one of actual possession, and the jury was 
accordingly instructed only on this theory. App. 555 
(instructing the jury that “[t]he term possess means to 
exercise authority, dominion or control over an object,” 
and making no mention of control over an area where an 
object was found).   
Because the Government proceeded solely on a 
theory of actual possession, we hold that Caldwell’s 
knowledge was not at issue in the case. Although 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) criminalizes the “knowing” 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a 
defendant’s knowledge is almost never a material issue 
when the government relies exclusively on a theory of 
actual possession. Indeed, absent unusual circumstances 
(such as when a defendant claims he did not realize the 
object in his hand was a gun), the knowledge element in 
a felon-in-possession case will necessarily be satisfied if 
the jury finds the defendant physically possessed the 
firearm. See United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 946–
47 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that no reasonable jury in an 
actual possession case would acquit a defendant “based 
on the belief that the government proved possession but 
failed to prove knowledge”). This is true here, and 
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Caldwell conceded as much. His counsel repeatedly 
noted that if the jury found that Caldwell possessed the 
gun, then it must also find that his possession was 
knowing.
8
 
In United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 
2010), we recognized that, in a trial for a violation of § 
922(g)(1), knowledge and intent are not proper 404(b) 
purposes where the prosecution is based on the 
defendant’s actual possession of the firearm. The 
defendant in Lee was pulled over pursuant to a routine 
traffic stop. While approaching Lee’s window, the officer 
scanned the back seat and observed a large black coat 
that appeared to be wrapped around a long narrow object. 
Id. at 174. Immediately suspicious, the officer 
commanded Lee to raise his hands, but instead, Lee 
drove off. Id. Investigators later found the black coat and 
an AK-47 assault rifle about a mile down the road near 
where Lee abandoned his vehicle. Id. at 175. At trial, Lee 
                                                 
8
  See App. 119 (offering to “stipulate that whoever 
possessed the firearm on January 24, 2012 also had the 
requisite knowledge and intent to possess that firearm”); App. 
317 (arguing that knowledge was not at issue because 
“[w]hoever possessed [the gun] knew it.”); App. 600–01 
(stating in closing arguments that “whoever possessed that 
gun had the knowledge that it was a gun and intended to 
possess it. It’s who possessed it [that] is the question. Not 
knowledge and intent.”). 
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denied possessing the firearm, claiming that it was never 
in his vehicle and that he was not the person who 
disposed of it. Id. at 176. Over the defense’s objection, 
the district court admitted, as relevant to Lee’s 
knowledge and intent, statements that he made to 
investigators, including that “he had access to a lot of 
guns and would use them against anyone who threatens 
him or his family.” Id. On appeal, we held that these 
statements were not admissible to show Lee’s 
knowledge: 
Lee’s trial . . . was not about whether he 
knew that he had a rifle in the back seat of 
his Jeep. There was no question of accident 
or mistake. Rather, Lee’s defense was 
simply that there was no rifle in his Jeep and 
that the rifle recovered at the Apartments 
was not his. 
. . . . 
. . . Lee has not put knowledge at issue. Lee 
is not arguing that he did not know there 
was a rifle in his back seat. His argument is 
a straightforward denial that any gun was 
there. 
 
Id. at 186–87. Because Lee’s knowledge was not at issue 
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in the case, we concluded that knowledge was not a 
proper Rule 404(b) purpose for admitting the statements.
9
 
Id.; see also Lee, 612 F.3d at 200 (Rendell, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with majority’s conclusion that “the knowledge 
and intent rationales for admitting the statements [about 
guns] do not hold water”).  
Our sister circuits that have considered this 
question agree that knowledge is generally not at issue in 
a prosecution under § 922(g)(1) where the government 
claims the defendant actually possessed the gun. In 
United States v. Linares, the defendant was prosecuted 
for being a felon in possession of a firearm based on 
three eye witness accounts that he fired a gun from the 
window of his car and later tossed it away. 367 F.3d at 
944. Over objection, the district court permitted the 
government to introduce evidence of Linares’s prior 
conviction for unlawful firearm possession in order to 
show his “intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake.” 
Id. at 946. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit concluded the 
evidence was erroneously admitted. The court explained: 
“If the jury believed these eyewitnesses, then Linares 
                                                 
9
  The majority ultimately concluded the statements were 
admissible for another Rule 404(b) purpose: motive. United 
States v. Lee, 612 F.3d at 189. The Government has not 
offered motive as a proper purpose in this case, nor is there a 
colorable argument for admitting Caldwell’s prior convictions 
to show motive to possess the gun found at the scene. 
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possessed the gun knowingly; if it did not, then it should 
have acquitted based on the government’s failure to 
prove possession rather than its failure to prove 
knowledge.” Id. Left with this disjunctive choice between 
actual possession or no possession, the court held the 
evidence was inadmissible because “no reasonable jury 
could have concluded that the defendant possessed a 
firearm either unknowingly or mistakenly.”10 Id. at 950. 
Similarly, in United States v. Jones, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that knowledge was not a proper 
404(b) purpose where the government’s case was 
premised on a theory of actual possession. A New 
Orleans police officer witnessed Jones remove a gun 
from his waistband and place it under a house. Jones, 484 
F.3d at 785. Jones claimed he never possessed the 
weapon. Id. Over Jones’s objection, the district court 
permitted the government to introduce evidence that he 
had previously been convicted of the same offense. Id. In 
reversing the conviction, the Fifth Circuit explained that, 
unlike constructive possession cases where “knowledge 
and intent are frequently at issue,” actual possession 
cases require the government to show only that the 
defendant was aware that he physically possessed the 
gun. Id. at 788. After concluding that the government’s 
                                                 
10
  Despite concluding the evidence was improperly 
admitted, the court upheld Linares’s conviction because it 
concluded the error was harmless. Linares, 367 F.3d at 953. 
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case relied on an actual possession theory, see id. at 790 
(rejecting the constructive possession theory because 
Jones did “not own, rent, occupy, or otherwise exercise 
any dominion over” the house underneath which the gun 
was recovered), the court held that knowledge was not a 
proper basis for admitting the evidence. Id. 
The record here suggests that the able District 
Judge initially understood these principles and 
recognized that Caldwell’s knowledge was not a material 
issue since the only disputed fact was whether he actually 
possessed the gun. The Court even noted that knowledge 
might be at issue “in a constructive possession kind of 
situation,” app. 314, but not where Caldwell was “saying 
he never had a gun.” App. 313. Yet despite starting in the 
right direction, the Court ultimately changed course, 
concluding that Caldwell “put his knowledge . . . at issue 
by claiming innocence.” App. 526. Based on the 
principles we have recited above, this decision was 
incorrect. 
Finally, we believe it necessary to address the 
District Court’s suggestion that Caldwell “put his 
knowledge at issue by claiming innocence.” It is unclear 
whether the District Court understood Caldwell to have 
“claimed innocence” by testifying at trial, or more 
broadly by pleading not guilty. Either way, we believe 
this line of reasoning is improper. 
Situations may indeed arise where the content of a 
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defendant’s trial testimony transforms a previously 
irrelevant 404(b) purpose into a material issue in a case. 
For example, if Caldwell had testified that he thought the 
object in his hand was something other than a gun, then it 
would immediately become critical for the prosecution to 
rebut his claim of mistake and to show his knowledge of 
the true nature of the thing possessed. We disagree, 
however, with the proposition that, merely by denying 
guilt of an offense with a knowledge-based mens rea, a 
defendant opens the door to admissibility of prior 
convictions of the same crime. Such a holding would 
eviscerate Rule 404(b)’s protection and completely 
swallow the general rule against admission of prior bad 
acts. See United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d 1063, 
1071 (7th Cir. 2011)) (explaining that “if a mere claim of 
innocence were enough to automatically put intent at 
issue, the resulting exception would swallow the general 
rule against admission of prior bad acts”). Accordingly, 
we reject the suggestion that “claiming innocence” is 
sufficient to place knowledge at issue for purposes of 
Rule 404(b). 
Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
knowledge was not at issue in this case and, thus, was not 
a proper basis for admitting evidence of Caldwell’s prior 
convictions. 
 (2) 
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We also conclude that the Government failed to 
satisfy the second step of the 404(b) inquiry which 
requires that it show that the proffered evidence is 
actually relevant to the identified non-propensity 
purpose. “In proffering [prior act] evidence, the 
government must explain how [the evidence] fits into a 
chain of inferences—a chain that connects the evidence 
to a proper purpose, no link of which is a forbidden 
propensity inference.” Davis, 726 F.3d at 442 (citing 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887). We require that this chain be 
articulated with careful precision because, even when a 
non-propensity purpose is “at issue” in a case, the 
evidence offered may be completely irrelevant to that 
purpose, or relevant only in an impermissible way. 
The Government argues that Caldwell’s prior 
convictions are relevant to show his knowledge, yet it has 
failed to satisfactorily explain why this is so. There is in 
the record no articulation by the Government of a logical 
chain of inferences showing how Caldwell’s prior 
convictions are relevant to show his knowledge. Nor does 
the Government present such a chain of logical 
inferences in its argument on appeal. Instead, the 
Government repeatedly returns to its baseline position 
that the evidence is generally relevant to show Caldwell’s 
knowledge that he possessed the gun. This tells us 
nothing about how the evidence accomplishes this task, 
and is insufficient to secure admission under Rule 404(b). 
The record reveals that the District Court likewise 
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failed to articulate how the disputed evidence tends to 
show that Caldwell knowingly possessed the gun. During 
the first trial, the District Court connected the 
admissibility of the evidence to Caldwell’s credibility as 
a witness, stating that because “this is a complete 
credibility determination . . . [the evidence] is probative 
for knowledge.” App. 319. We fail to see what bearing 
Caldwell’s credibility as a trial witness has on whether he 
knowingly possessed a gun the evening of the stop. 
Caldwell’s prior convictions may tend to impeach his 
credibility as a witness, but the admissibility of evidence 
for impeachment purposes is an entirely distinct question 
from its admissibility under 404(b).
11
  
Perhaps recognizing that credibility was another 
matter entirely, the District Court provided a different 
rationale for admitting the evidence in the second trial. 
The Court explained that, because the charged offense 
was “the knowing possession of a firearm . . . , the 
Government may present other acts or evidence to prove 
. . . knowledge.” App. 525–26. We have already 
expressed our disagreement with the suggestion that 
knowledge was at issue in this case. Aside from that, 
however, the Court’s statement still does not explain how 
the evidence tends to prove Caldwell’s knowledge that he 
possessed the gun. Again, we emphasize that it is not 
                                                 
11
  We address the admissibility of the evidence for 
impeachment under Rule 609 in Part III, infra. 
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enough to merely recite a Rule 404(b) purpose that is at 
issue; the Court must articulate how the evidence is 
probative of that purpose. 
The reason we require the proponent and the court 
to articulate a logical chain of inferences connecting the 
evidence to a non-propensity purpose is because we must 
assure that the evidence is not susceptible to being used 
improperly by the jury. Another way to frame this 
requirement is to ask the prosecution to explain “exactly 
how the proffered evidence should work in the mind of a 
juror to establish the fact the government claims to be 
trying to prove.” Miller, 673 F.3d at 699. Framed this 
way, the flaw in the evidence proffered in this case 
becomes apparent.  
The prosecution’s fundamental task was to prove 
that Caldwell unlawfully possessed the gun recovered by 
the detectives. Caldwell’s defense was that he never 
possessed the gun. The prosecution sought to admit 
evidence that, on two prior occasions, Caldwell was 
convicted of unlawfully possessing firearms. The 
question the prosecution must answer is this: “How, 
exactly, do Caldwell’s two prior convictions for unlawful 
firearm possession suggest he knowingly possessed this 
gun on this occasion?” Hard as we try, we see only one 
answer to that question: If Caldwell knowingly possessed 
firearms in the past, he was more likely to have 
knowingly possessed the firearm this time. This is 
precisely the propensity-based inferential logic that Rule 
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404(b) forbids.  
We can envision numerous scenarios where, with 
slightly different facts, a proper, non-propensity chain 
might be forged. For example, assume that Caldwell’s 
knowledge was at issue because he claimed to have 
believed the gun in his hand was a toy. Under this 
hypothetical, the chain of inferences leading to the 
admissibility of the evidence would be as follows: 
Caldwell was twice previously convicted of unlawful 
firearm possession; he is, thus, familiar with the touch 
and feel of an authentic firearm; and because he knows 
what a real firearm feels like, it is more likely that he 
knew the gun in his hand on this occasion was a real 
firearm.  
Alternatively, assume the gun was discovered 
inside a backpack that Caldwell was carrying, and that he 
defended the charge by claiming the gun was placed 
there without his knowledge. If the proffered evidence 
consisted of eyewitness testimony that Caldwell 
threatened another individual with a black handgun two 
hours before his arrest, the chain of logical inferences 
could be forged as follows: Caldwell possessed a black 
handgun earlier that evening, therefore it is less likely 
that a similar black handgun was unknowingly deposited 
in his backpack.  
Importantly, however, the chain of inferences in 
this latter hypothetical may not necessarily extend to 
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permit the prosecution to introduce evidence of prior 
convictions for unlawful gun possession, particularly 
where those convictions involved different firearms and 
are remote in time. As the Seventh Circuit explained, “If 
the prior possession was of a different gun, then its value 
as direct or circumstantial evidence of the charged 
possession drops and the likelihood that it is being used 
to show propensity to possess guns rises considerably. 
Similarly, as the prior possession is further removed in 
time, it becomes less probative of possession on the date 
charged.” Miller, 673 F.3d at 695. 
We engage in the foregoing exercise simply to 
demonstrate why it is important that a district judge go 
beyond the question of whether knowledge, or any other 
non-propensity purpose, is directly at issue in a case. The 
judge must also analytically consider whether the 
proffered evidence does in fact tend to establish the fact 
the proponent is trying to prove. The case before us 
proves the point. The record suggests that once the 
District Court concluded that knowledge was at issue, it 
was content to allow any evidence offered for that 
purpose. Yet had the Court been more exacting in 
requiring the prosecution to articulate how Caldwell’s 
2005 and 2006 firearms convictions tended to prove his 
knowledge that he was holding this gun some seven years 
later, it would have been clear that the evidentiary chain 
cannot survive close scrutiny.  
The Government was unable to articulate any 
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theory that united the prior convictions to Caldwell’s 
knowledge on the night of his arrest. The evidence 
provided the jury with nothing more than the ability to 
draw inferences about Caldwell’s propensity to possess 
guns. That evidence should not have been admitted. 
(3) 
We also conclude that the District Court’s Rule 
403 analysis did not provide the meaningful balancing 
required by our precedent. Before prior act evidence may 
be admitted under Rule 404(b), we require district courts 
to balance the probative value of the proffered evidence 
against its prejudicial effect under Rule 403. We will 
reverse where the Court’s reasoning “is not apparent 
from the record.” Smith, 725 F.3d at 348 (quoting 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889).  
We are not required here to perform Rule 403 
balancing because the proffered 404(b) purpose was not 
at issue in the case, nor was the evidence probative of the 
identified purpose. Nonetheless, in the interest of 
providing guidance on this issue, we will explain why the 
District Court’s analysis fell short of the mark.  
Even if Caldwell’s prior convictions were 
probative of his knowledge (which they were not), the 
probative value would, at best, be minimal. As already 
explained, in a trial for unlawful firearm possession by a 
convicted felon, a defendant’s knowledge is generally 
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subsumed within a finding that he physically possessed 
the firearm. Accordingly, any value added by the prior 
convictions on the issue of Caldwell’s knowledge would 
be negligible.  
Further, the probative value of prior act evidence is 
diminished where the defendant does not contest the fact 
for which supporting evidence has been offered. Such 
was the case here. Caldwell conceded to the jury that 
“whoever possessed th[e] gun had the knowledge that it 
was a gun and intended to possess it.” App. 600. We do 
not mean to suggest that the admissibility of evidence 
under 404(b) is predicated on the manner in which the 
defendant frames his defense. It is not. Sampson, 980 
F.2d at 888 (“Issues are not irrelevant just because the 
defense’s theory presupposes them to be so.”). 
Nevertheless, Rule 403 balancing may tilt in favor of 
excluding highly prejudicial evidence when it is offered 
to establish a fact that is completely uncontested by the 
defendant.  
On the other side of the scale, it is beyond cavil 
that the evidence of Caldwell’s prior firearm convictions 
was highly prejudicial. As the Advisory Committee’s 
Note to Rule 404(a) explains, the prejudice associated 
with character evidence is quite real: 
Character evidence is of slight probative 
value and may be very prejudicial. It tends 
to distract the trier of fact from the main 
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question of what actually happened on the 
particular occasion. It subtly permits the 
trier of fact to reward the good man and to 
punish the bad man because of their 
respective characters despite what the 
evidence in the case shows actually 
happened. 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) Advisory Committee’s Note; see 
also Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476 (explaining that 
character evidence “is said to weigh too much with the 
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one with 
a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to 
defend against a particular charge”). The prejudicial 
impact is only heightened when character evidence is 
admitted in the form of a prior criminal conviction, 
especially a prior conviction for the same crime as that 
being tried. Of this fact, the Government is fully aware. 
“Although the government will hardly admit it,” its 
motive for introducing prior bad act evidence is “often 
mixed between an urge to show some other consequential 
fact as well as to impugn the defendant’s character.” 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886. 
 Based on the record before us, we conclude that 
the District Court’s Rule 403 balancing does not reflect 
the meaningful evaluation of these competing 
considerations as required by our cases. As a preliminary 
matter, the Court did not provide a Rule 403 balancing 
until the Government requested it “[f]or the record.” 
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App. 526. Following this request, the Court gave the 
following statement: 
What I want to say is that not only are they 
admissible under 404(b), but because 
knowledge and intent are at issue here, they 
are more probative than prejudicial. I find 
that the probative value outweighs any 
prejudicial effect as well as to their 
admissibility. 
App. 527. This statement is nothing more than a bare 
recitation of Rule 403, with an added notation about the 
Court’s understanding that knowledge is at issue in the 
case. The Court did not address the diminished probative 
value of the evidence in light of the fact that the issue of 
Caldwell’s knowledge was unchallenged. Nor did it 
address the particularly prejudicial impact of introducing 
evidence that Caldwell was previously convicted of the 
identical crime for which he was then being tried. 
 “When a court engages in a Rule 403 balancing 
and articulates on the record a rational explanation, we 
will rarely disturb its ruling.” Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889. 
But we cannot infer such a “rational explanation” where 
the court merely recites the text of the rule. The 
reasoning underlying the Court’s Rule 403 balancing was 
“not apparent from the record.” Smith, 725 F.3d at 348 
(citation omitted). This omission provides an independent 
ground for reversal. 
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C. 
The Government maintains that, even if erroneous, 
the admission of Caldwell’s prior convictions does not 
warrant reversal because any error was harmless. “The 
test for harmless error is whether it is ‘highly probable 
that the error did not contribute to the judgment.’” United 
States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 391–92 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citations omitted). “This ‘[h]igh probability’ 
requires that the court possess a ‘sure conviction that the 
error did not prejudice the defendant.’” Id. at 392.  
To support its claim that the error was harmless, 
the Government contends that the remainder of the 
evidence offered against Caldwell was “overwhelming,” 
noting that two detectives testified that they observed 
Caldwell with the gun and no one was able to place the 
gun in Tigney’s hands. Though the prosecution’s case 
may have been strong, it does not provide us with a “sure 
conviction” that the evidence of Caldwell’s prior 
convictions did not contribute to the judgment.  
This is not a case where the defendant declined to 
offer a substantive defense and chose instead to hold the 
government to its burden of proof. Rather, Caldwell 
vigorously maintained his innocence throughout both 
trials, testifying on his own behalf and introducing 
witness testimony corroborating his claim that he held a 
cell phone rather than a firearm. Caldwell’s theory that 
Tigney possessed the firearm was bolstered by evidence 
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that Tigney provided the officers with a false name at the 
time of the stop. He also managed to poke holes in the 
Government’s investigation, pointing out that it failed to 
obtain available security surveillance tapes. 
We are aware, of course, that the harmless error 
question in this case is raised against the backdrop of an 
earlier mistrial in which the jury was unable to agree 
upon a verdict. Yet our conclusion that the error in this 
case was not harmless is based solely on our review of 
the record from the second trial. Our task is not to weigh 
the evidence anew, but simply to determine whether “it is 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.” Smith, 725 F.3d at 348 (quoting United States 
v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000)). Based on 
the record before us, we cannot say the erroneously 
admitted evidence was inconsequential to the verdict. 
Accordingly, we are unable to find it harmless. 
III. 
The Government alternatively argues that the 
evidence of Caldwell’s prior convictions was admissible 
for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609(a)(1)(B). The Government preserved this 
argument by proffering Rule 609 as a basis for admission 
both in its pretrial filings and during trial. App. 66, 315, 
525. Because the District Court found the evidence 
admissible under Rule 404(b), it did not reach the 
Government’s alternative argument. See App. 319–20 
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(“So the record is clear, I’m not saying it is . . . 
admissible for credibility. I’m saying it’s admissible for 
knowledge and intent.”).12 Although such circumstances 
may be unusual, it is conceivable that evidence could be 
excluded under Rule 404(b), yet admissible for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609.
13
 See 28 Charles 
                                                 
12
  The Court did, however, explicitly decline to admit 
several other prior convictions under Rule 609, including 
cruelty to animals, criminal trespass, and heroin possession. 
App. 319.  
13
  The Eight Circuit has cogently explained why this is 
so: 
[T]he respective rules operate in two completely 
different situations. In a criminal setting, 
evidence offered under Rule 404(b) is 
substantive evidence against the accused, i.e., it 
is part of the government’s case offered to 
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rule 
609 evidence on the other hand has to do with 
the accused’s ability to tell the truth when 
testifying on his or her own behalf. While both 
rules speak of “probative value” and 
“prejudice,” it is critical to note that evidence 
offered under the respective rules is probative 
as to different matters. The probative character 
of evidence under Rule 609 has to do with 
credibility of a witness, while 404(b) 
“probativeness” essentially goes to the question 
42 
 
Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 6134, at 268 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 
Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure]. 
Accordingly, we consider whether Rule 609 provided an 
alternative basis for admitting the evidence of Caldwell’s 
prior convictions. 
Rule 609 permits evidence of a prior felony 
conviction to be offered to impeach a testifying witness. 
However, when the testifying witness is also the 
defendant in a criminal trial, the prior conviction is 
admitted only “if the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.” Fed. 
R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B). This reflects a heightened 
balancing test and a reversal of the standard for 
admission under Rule 403. Commentators have observed 
that structuring the balancing in this manner creates a 
“predisposition toward exclusion.” Wright & Gold, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 6132, at 216. “An 
exception is made only where the prosecution shows that 
the evidence makes a tangible contribution to the 
                                                                                                             
of whether or not the accused committed the 
crime charged. Any similarity or overlap in the 
standards of admissibility under the respective 
rules is irrelevant because the rules apply to 
completely distinct situations. 
United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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evaluation of credibility and that the usual high risk of 
unfair prejudice is not present.” Id. § 6132, at 217. 
Our Court has recognized four factors that should 
be considered when weighing the probative value against 
the prejudicial effect under this heightened test. These 
factors include: “(1) the kind of crime involved; (2) when 
the conviction occurred; (3) the importance of the 
[defendant’s] testimony to the case; [and] (4) the 
importance of the credibility of the defendant.” Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1982).  
 When evaluating the first factor—the kind of 
crime involved—courts consider both the impeachment 
value of the prior conviction as well as its similarity to 
the charged crime. The impeachment value relates to how 
probative the prior conviction is to the witness’s 
character for truthfulness. 5 Jack B. Weinstein & 
Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 
609.06[3][b] (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Weinstein’s 
Federal Evidence]. Crimes of violence generally have 
lower probative value in weighing credibility, but may 
still be admitted after balancing the other factors. In 
contrast, crimes that by their nature imply some 
dishonesty, such as theft, have greater impeachment 
value and are significantly more likely to be admissible. 
Id.  
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With respect to the similarity of the crime to the 
offense charged, the balance tilts further toward 
exclusion as the offered impeachment evidence becomes 
more similar to the crime for which the defendant is 
being tried. As the Fourth Circuit has explained: 
Admission of evidence of a similar offense 
often does little to impeach the credibility of 
a testifying defendant while undoubtedly 
prejudicing him. The jury, despite limiting 
instructions, can hardly avoid drawing the 
inference that the past conviction suggests 
some probability that defendant committed 
the similar offense for which he is currently 
charged. The generally accepted view, 
therefore, is that evidence of similar 
offenses for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609 should be admitted sparingly if at 
all. 
United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 297–98 (4th Cir. 
1992) (quoting  United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 
418–19 (4th Cir. 1981)); see also Weinstein’s Federal 
Evidence § 609.05[3][d] (“[P]rior convictions for the 
same or similar crimes are admitted sparingly.”); Wright 
& Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6134, at 253 
(“[T]he danger of unfair prejudice is enhanced if the 
witness is the accused and the crime was similar to the 
crime now charged, since this increases the risk that the 
jury will draw an impermissible inference under Rule 
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404(a).”); cf. United States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88, 94 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (finding that district court did not abuse its 
discretion by excluding evidence of prior crime because 
it was “too similar” to the charged offense).14 
                                                 
14
  Some have suggested that the unfair prejudice of an 
identical prior conviction can be reduced by permitting the 
introduction of only the fact and date of conviction, but not 
the nature of the crime. See United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 
414, 419 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that the district court should 
have excluded the similar prior conviction “or at the very 
least limited disclosure to the fact of conviction without 
revealing its nature”). Circumstances may exist where 
redacting the facts underlying the prior conviction in this 
manner is a viable way to reduce the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence. However, this approach may create other obstacles 
to admission. There are many types of felonies, and not all 
felony convictions strongly support the inference that the 
defendant is untrustworthy. Thus, the probative value of a 
prior felony conviction will be diminished where the jury is 
not provided information about the prior conviction that 
would help in evaluating the extent to which the offense 
reflects on the defendant’s veracity as a trial witness. 
Additionally, in a situation such as this one—where the jury 
is already aware that the defendant is a convicted felon—the 
probative value is further diminished because introducing 
only the fact that the defendant has a prior history of unlawful 
behavior would not tell the jury anything it does not already 
know. 
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 The second factor is the age of the prior 
conviction. Convictions more than ten years old are 
presumptively excluded and must satisfy the special 
balancing requirements in Rule 609(b) to overcome this 
presumption. But even where the conviction is not 
subject to the ten-year restriction, “the passage of a 
shorter period can still reduce [a prior conviction’s] 
probative value.” Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 6134, at 258. The age of a conviction may 
weigh particularly in favor of exclusion “where other 
circumstances combine with the passage of time to 
suggest a changed character.” Id. For example, a prior 
conviction may have less probative value where the 
defendant-witness has maintained a spotless record since 
the earlier conviction or where the prior conviction was a 
mere youthful indiscretion. Conversely, the probative 
value of an older conviction may remain undiminished if 
the defendant was recently released from confinement or 
has multiple intervening convictions, both of which could 
suggest his character has not improved. See id. § 6134, at 
259 (collecting cases). 
 The third factor inquires into the importance of the 
defendant’s testimony to his defense at trial. “The tactical 
need for the accused to testify on his or her own behalf 
may militate against use of impeaching convictions. If it 
is apparent to the trial court that the accused must testify 
to refute strong prosecution evidence, then the court 
should consider whether, by permitting conviction 
47 
 
impeachment, the court in effect prevents the accused 
from testifying.” Glenn Weissenberger & James J. 
Duane, Weissenberger’s Federal Evidence § 609.2 (4th 
ed. 2001); see also Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 
609.05[3][e] (“A defendant’s decision about whether to 
testify may be based in part on whether his prior 
convictions will be admitted for impeachment purposes. 
Thus, the fact that a defendant’s testimony is important to 
demonstrate the validity of his or her defense constitutes 
a factor weighing against the admission of a prior 
conviction.”). “If, on the other hand, the defense can 
establish the subject matter of the defendant’s testimony 
by other means, the defendant’s testimony is less 
necessary, so a prior conviction is more likely to be 
admitted.” Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 609.05[3][e]; 
see also United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341, 1344 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (noting that prejudicial impact diminished 
where defendant “did not obviously need to testify to 
raise his various defenses” because several other defense 
witnesses provided the same testimony).  
 The final factor concerns the significance of the 
defendant’s credibility to the case. “When the 
defendant’s credibility is a central issue, this weighs in 
favor of admitting a prior conviction.” Weinstein’s 
Federal Evidence § 609.05[3][f]. See United States v. 
Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming 
admission of prior conviction under Rule 609(a) because 
the defendant’s credibility was important). Conversely, 
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the probative value of a defendant’s prior conviction may 
be diminished “where the witness testifies as to 
inconsequential matters or facts that are conclusively 
shown by other credible evidence.” Wright & Gold, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 6134, at 258.
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15
  We acknowledge the tension between the related third 
and fourth factors. See, e.g., Roger Park & Tom Lininger, The 
New Wigmore: Impeachment and Rehabilitation § 3.4.4.1.1.4 
(2012) (“There is a tension between these two factors. 
Perhaps they cancel each other out.”); Jeffrey Bellin, 
Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened 
the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior 
Convictions, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 289, 318 (2008) (“In 
essence, the factors cancel each other out. To the extent a 
defendant’s testimony is ‘important’ (for example, if the 
defendant is the key defense witness), his credibility becomes 
‘central’ in equal degree, leading to a curious equipoise. . . . 
Thus, [these] factors seem[] to have no practical significance 
at all, existing in a rough state of equipoise that prevent[s] 
either factor from impacting the overall impeachment 
calculus.”); Roderick Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach 
to Applying the ‘Balancing’ Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 
Syracuse L. Rev. 907, 943 & 945 (1980) (observing that “it 
appears that as one of these factors increases in importance in 
a particular case, so does the other” and “there appears to be 
no principled way to determine which factor should prevail”). 
Be that as it may, these factors have long been accepted as 
independent components of the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing 
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 After reviewing the record and the arguments 
presented on appeal, we conclude that the Government 
has failed to carry its burden of showing that the 
probative value of Caldwell’s prior convictions 
outweighs their prejudicial effect under Rule 
609(a)(1)(B). The only factor the Government identified 
in favor of admission is that Caldwell’s credibility was a 
central feature of the case. We do not minimize this 
point. At its core, this case was a “he said, they said” 
battle between Caldwell’s version of events and that of 
the detectives. See Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 6134, at 256 (“[W]here a case is reduced to 
a swearing contest between witnesses, the probative 
value of conviction is increased.”). But this single factor 
is not enough to warrant admission of the prior 
convictions where all others favor exclusion. Caldwell’s 
prior state conviction was quite similar to the charged 
offense, and his prior federal conviction was an identical 
match. That made the “priors” highly prejudicial. At the 
opposite end, the impeachment value of the prior 
convictions is low because unlawful firearms convictions 
do not, by their nature, imply a dishonest act. The 
Government also failed to show that the probative value 
of the evidence was not diminished by the passage of 
more than six-and-a-half years. And finally, Caldwell’s 
testimony was fundamentally important to his defense. 
                                                                                                             
inquiry and we conclude that they should continue to inform 
the district court’s admissibility determination.  
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As already noted, the jury was required to choose 
between Caldwell’s version of events and that provided 
by the officers. Given the consistency of the officers’ 
accounts, Caldwell would have taken a great risk by 
failing to testify in his defense. 
 When offering a prior conviction to impeach a 
testifying defendant, the government bears the burden of 
satisfying the heightened balancing test set out in Rule 
609(a)(1)(B). Based on our review of the record before 
us, the Government failed to establish that “the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, Rule 609 was 
not a proper alternative basis for admitting Caldwell’s 
prior convictions.
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IV. 
Finally, Caldwell claims the District Court erred 
by refusing to admit Tigney’s out-of-court confession to 
defense counsel as a statement against penal interests 
under Rule 804(b)(3). We review a district court’s 
decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 
804(b)(3) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Boyce, 
849 F.2d 833, 837 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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  Our determination that the Government did not satisfy 
its heightened burden under Rule 609(a)(1)(B) in the previous 
trial does not preclude it from attempting to satisfy this 
burden in any subsequent proceeding.  
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Rule 804(b)(3) provides an exception to the 
general rule against the admission of hearsay statements 
when a declarant is unavailable and his out-of-court 
statement tends to subject him to criminal liability. Fed. 
R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). There is, however, one caveat to 
admission. Where the statement is offered to exculpate 
the accused in a criminal trial, it must be “supported by 
corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its 
trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(B). This 
requirement reflects the concern that a third party with 
less risk of prosecution will fabricate a confession to 
exculpate the guilty party. See United States v. Guillette, 
547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing the 
“inherent danger that third party confessions tending to 
exculpate a defendant are the result of fabrication”). 
Importantly, the rule “does not require that the 
information within the statement be clearly corroborated; 
it requires only that there be corroborating circumstances 
that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement 
itself.” Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 804.06[5][b] 
(second emphasis added); see also George E. Dix, et al., 
McCormick on Evidence § 319 (7th ed. 2013) 
(“Significantly, the rule does not require that the 
statements themselves be independently proved to be 
accurate; rather it requires only that corroborating 
circumstances indicate trustworthiness.”). 
We assess corroboration in light of the totality of 
circumstances. See Boyce, 849 F.2d at 837. The Federal 
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Rules of Evidence do not describe the type of 
corroborating circumstances that “clearly” indicate 
trustworthiness, nor has our Court expounded on this 
issue. Examples of corroborating circumstances 
identified by other courts include the lack of a close 
relationship between declarant and the accused, United 
States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1346 (7th Cir. 1984), 
the fact that the statement was voluntarily made after the 
declarant was advised of his Miranda rights, United 
States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 347–48 (6th Cir. 1998); 
and the fact that the statement was not made to curry 
favor with the government, United States v. Garcia, 897 
F.2d 1413, 1421 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Weinstein’s 
Federal Evidence § 804.06[5][b][ii] (listing these three as 
examples of circumstances that might satisfy the 
corroboration requirement). 
Here, the only remotely corroborating 
circumstance is that Tigney confessed to Caldwell’s 
defense counsel at a time when the Government was not 
investigating him in connection with the offense. This 
aside, all other considerations reflect adversely on the 
trustworthiness of the statement. The record reflects that 
Tigney viewed Caldwell “like an older brother,” app. 
108, and thus might have been motivated to lie on 
Caldwell’s behalf. The confession was made to defense 
investigators (not prosecutors) and it was made nearly 
four months after Caldwell was arrested. At the time the 
statement was made, Tigney was not under oath, had not 
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been read his Miranda rights, and was not represented by 
counsel. Finally, Tigney’s account changed on multiple 
occasions, with him ultimately recanting his admission to 
defense investigators. Given these circumstances, we 
hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding Tigney’s statements because the totality of the 
circumstances support its conclusion that the confession 
lacked the indicia of trustworthiness required by Rule 
804(b)(3). 
V. 
 In sum, we conclude that the admission under Rule 
404(b) of Caldwell’s prior convictions for unlawful 
firearm possession was erroneous and that the error was 
not harmless. While it may be that this opinion breaks no 
new ground, we believe it necessary to reiterate the 
importance of a methodical approach by the proponent of 
prior act evidence and a carefully reasoned ruling by the 
trial judge who must decide the question of admissibility.  
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the judgment 
of conviction and sentence and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
